

## Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Religiosity or Alice in Wonder-Land?

UMAR ELEMS MAHMUD, BECKY ALIEGBA, OMADACHI OKLOBIA  
Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria.

**Abstract.** This study attempts a programmed expository analysis of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria with major objective to examine the philosophy of the sect and the terrorism. Using content analytical approach, the study examines the modus operandi of the insurgents, in a bid to answer the question as to whether or not Boko Haram is motivated by religiosity, or by the adventure into terrorism, or *mutatis-mutandis*, by a share desire to spring wonders. Flowing from the analysis of the natural name of the sect, and its mode of operation, the findings of the study reveal that Boko Haram insurgency is primarily against the West and its culture, with no evidence of bias against any religion: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Budism, et-cetera. Concluding, the study surmises that Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is intended to initiate and propagate intractable terrorist attacks designed to undermine and rubbish the internal security integrity and capability of the Nigerian State, and recommends, *modus vivendi*, a political dialogue, to complement the ongoing military counter insurgency option.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Insurgency, Terrorism, Philosophy, Religiosity, Frustration

### 1. Introduction

The concept and experience of terrorism are as old as human co-existence. In the early days, it manifested either in the form of tyranny or dictatorship, aimed at subjugating the weaker states by the stronger ones, or even by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or groups motivated and propelled by specific agenda. The assumption of global dimension by terrorism is of considerable concern, given the high importance of security for development. Indeed, no meaningful

development can be achieved by a nation that is deeply immersed in insecurity. At the national and international levels therefore, deliberate policies aimed at resisting and combating all forms of terrorism are consciously evolved by governments.

In terms of scope, effects and consequences, no country, however powerful, can enjoy immunity from the destructive consequences of terrorism; not even the super power members of the United Nations (UN). Less developed countries (LDCs), Nigeria inclusive, are often soft targets, given the high rate of their vulnerability. The exposure to terrorism by a country like Nigeria can be exacerbated if the internal security architecture and management which should ordinarily provide the first level shield against external aggression are weakly formed.

Religion is fundamental in the ontology of human co-existence. Religious difference has triggered inter-tribal and even international disagreements, resulting in armed conflict across the globe. In Nigeria, the jihadist movements initiated and led by Othman Dan Fodio of the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century, and the Maitatsine movements led by Mohammed Marwa of North East Nigeria in the 1970s and 1980s, are classical cases of Islamic campaigns with objects to eradicate the secular system, enthrone Islamic state and institutionalize Sharia-based government.

The activities of the Maitatsine group which led to the violent clashes in Yola, Gombe, Jos and Kano resulted in huge losses of lives and property in the affected areas, as reported by Abimbola and Adesote (2012) and Bashir (2012). The Islamic movements were not fundamentally different in philosophy from the “parent” international terrorist Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

The lexical meanings of Boko Haram (BH) is better understood when the literally meaning of the two words, “Boko” and “Haram”, are respectively clarified. Danjibo (2009) provided a contextual interpretation thus: “Boko” means “foreign” or “Western” in Hausa language; while “Haram” means “forbidden”, “ungodly” or “sinful” in Arabic. Read together, “Boko Haram” means “book or Western or foreign is forbidden, ungodly or sinful”. Flowing from the meaning, Bumah (2009) is of the view that the mission of Boko Haram is to firmly reject Western education, all the benefits of its attendant modernity for the enthronement of Sharia across Nigeria, using the instrumentality of terrorism.

The contradiction or irony in the philosophy of Boko Haram is the copious employment and deployment of the numerous benefits of Western education in prosecuting a war against Western education. The opacity of the agenda of Boko Haram is therefore rooted in this contradiction: is the movement purely terrorist, or a radical display of religiosity, or a bizarre phenomenon that makes no sense (an Alice in Wonderland)?. Examining this contradiction is the motivation for this study.

## 2. Statement of the Research Problem

Like its international and domestic movements and collaborators: Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Maitatsine, El-Zankzaky’s Shiite, etc, the activities of Boko Haram are destructive. The cost and loss: financial, economic, human lives, international reputation among others, are too huge to roundly estimate. Governments (Federal and affected States) have been preoccupied with containing the direct assault on Nigeria by the unrepentant sect. The problem is confounding, given that beyond the “message” derivable from the name of the sect or movement, the true vision and objectives of the attacks remain unreadable or opaque. In the circumstance of the blurred understanding, results of the efforts at putting down the inferno by aiming at the flame, instead of the base, have remained suboptimal. It appears that strategic counter-insurgency responses to the attacks are atimes lagged, resulting in devastation to Nigeria.

In their efforts, available literature, commentaries and some empirical studies: Adesote (2012), Bashir (2012), et cetera, avert their foci away from the imperative of gaining insights into the puzzle about the true motive or philosophy of Boko Haram insurgency. This study contends, in departure, that a proper contextual understanding of the true motive of Boko Haram movement beyond the religious

subterfuge is a sine qua non for a credible prescription of any antidote for a lasting solution.

## 3. Research Questions

Flowing from the blurred nature of Boko Haram’s vision and mission, this study attempts to answer questions which include:

- Against the backdrop of the activities and modus operandi of Boko Haram sect, what: terrorism, insurgency, religious fanaticism or sheer wonder, is the motivation and objective?
- Why has fully and totally subjugating the sect remained intractable, after about ten years of armed combat?
- What workable modus vivendi can produce the much desired true end to the insurgency?

## 4. Objectives of the Study

The major objective is to analyse the philosophy and nature of Boko Haram insurgency, in order to gain insight into the fundamental question. Other objectives include: to examine the modus operandi of the sect, with a view to understanding the key factors in the internal security arrangement in combating the insurgency; and to propose a policy modus vivendi for early resolution.

## 5. Review of Literature and Theoretical Consideration

### 5.1 Conceptual Clarifications

#### 5.1.1 Terrorism

In the search for a precise definition of terrorism, scholars seem to hold differing views of terrorism. Nwankwo (1998), for instance, holds that terrorism is better explained through the maxim “imperialist terrorism begets revolutionary reaction in the same way as violent gives vent to violence”. The implication of Nwankwo’s view is that sustaining internal tyranny and external dictatorship via state oppression gives rise to an impulsive drive to terrorism in redress. The experience in the 19th century when greed propelled the excursion of the Europeans to Africa is typical of imperial terrorism of colonialism. The European Union (EU) has adopted a position that international terrorism is any act which seriously destroys a country with the aim of intimidating a population, compelling a government unduly, and attacks upon a people’s government or public facility. The EU’s definition is not different from the definitions offered by the

United Nations, FBI of America and African Union (AU).

### 5.1.2 Internal Security

Williams (2006) suggested that internal security means freedom from or absence of tendencies that could undermine the internal cohesion and corporate existence of a state. Internal security (IS) could also mean the ability and capacity to ensure the survival of vital institutions which exist for the promotion of a country's values, including the socio-political and economic goals. To Oyeniyi (2010), IS means freedom from danger to life and property and creating a conducive atmosphere for the people to pursue their legitimate interest within the society. Put succinctly, IS is the freedom from potential act or intention to undermine the peace, stability and progress of the people and nation (Williams, 2006). Undermining the IS of a country therefore poses a serious threat to the prospects of harmonious coexistence and relationship among communities. Disintegration provides a fertile ground on which international terrorism can grow and be propagated. The baseline for a nation's defence against any external aggression therefore is a tight IS. Ironically, the much that is done by the State and its agents in Nigeria appears inadequate, besides being skewed favourably toward external security (ES).

### 5.2 Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Attempts at propagating Islam as a cardinal religion in Nigeria dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, precisely in 1804, under the leadership of Othman Dan Fodio, the acclaimed founder of the Sokoto Caliphate engendered inter-religious and intertribal conflicts instigated by pockets of resistance from natives who considered the new dawn unacceptable.

The first major post-independence attempt was the uprising led by Muhammad Marwa, alias "Maitatsine" in the 1980s. Abimbola and Adesote (2012) write that the insurgency was so bloody that it led to casualties in Kano and Gombe initially. Analysts and writers: Danjibo (2009) and Fwatsha (2012) for example, suggest that Boko Haram derived its inspiration from the ideology and philosophy of Maitatsine. In effect, Boko Haram may be safely reported as springing off from Maitatsine, although the mode of operation may be Taliban (Benjamin, )

As Government battled to rout out Maitatsine, other groups: the "Society for the Prohibition or Elimination of Innovation and the Re-Establishment

of the Islamic Sunna", otherwise known as "Jama'atu Izalatul Bida'a Waiqanatil Sunna" (or "Izala" for short), which first showed up in Jos in 1978, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), said to have originated from Iran, with Yusuf as a prominent member, emerged (Dearn, 2011). Without doubt, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky is a founding member and the acclaimed leader of IMN. In any case, insinuations suggest that modern Boko Haram originated from the activities of the Maitatsine and or IMN, even though the exact origin is shrouded in mystery, as reported by Abimbola and Adesote (2012).

Holding a contrary view, Walker, relying on pieces of Information gathered from different official sources, writes that the origin of Boko Haram may be located in 2002 when some radical Islamic youth in Maiduguri, during a worship, kicked against corruption and the prevalence of fake Islamic adherents. In 2003, an armed conflict over a fish pond between the youth and the Police ended in favour of the former who were reported to have overpowered the latter, seizing their arms, thereby paving way for the military siege that ended in over seventy casualties, including Mohammed-Ali (Tough, 2013). Tough(2013) also reported that the insurgent group was earlier indoctrinated in a boarder village named Kanama in Yobe State in hard-line separatist Islamic principles when Mohammed Yusuf espoused anti-state ideology and beckoned on the Muslims to join the struggle to return to a life under Islamic law. At the end of the ritual, members who escaped from and survived the military attacks fled to Maiduguri to reunite with Yusuf, to re-strategies, for the task ahead (Walker, 2012).

Hitherto ignored by the State at all levels, the re-grouped sect waxed stronger and extended its contacts with older sister terrorist groups across borders; while new recruits were enlisted from amongst refugees, unemployed youths, out-of-school "children", indoctrinated graduates and many religious extremists from domestic and offshore environments, as reported by Njoku (2011). Njoku's account further puts the origin of the insurgent group at some date around 1995. The notion is that Mohammed Yusuf merely radicalized an extant sect from 2001 by expanding its membership and funding bases. Goaded by the perceived level of immorality characterized by massive corruption and anti-social behaviour, the malevolent Boko Haram sought to "proscribe Western education, which was believed to be the root cause of the anti-societal and irreligious malady. The professed goal of the insurgency by writers as noted may therefore be to enthrone Islamic

sharia which according to the sect purportedly forbids Western education.

The modus operandi of the sect, characterised by violence, traversed the use of improvised explosives, guerilla attacks on military bases, worship centres (including mosques and churches), and social congregations, armed robbery, kidnapping, suicide mission and massive attacks on settlements, be they urban or rural. Ironically, the theatre of the attacks have been the northern part of Nigeria, where Islam and its principles exhibit a very deep root and adherence, as respectively noted by Adibe (2012), Walker (2012) and Danjibo (2009). The use by the sect of modern advances in weaponry engendered by the application of science and technology by the sect contradicts their abhorrence of Western education from which such methods derive and therefore misses the point on the imagined ideological or philosophical basis of the movement. The ‘Tell’ magazine (2004:34), in it editorial, captured its view on the ideological position of Boko Haram:

The mission of the sect was to establish Islamic estate where orthodox Islam according to him (Yusuf

Mohammed, leader of the sect) frowns at Western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government including security agencies like police, military and other uniform personnel should be crushed.

Government’s response was reflected in the various military operations established to extinguish the insurgency. Thus, ‘Operation Saw Dust’, ‘Operation Lafia Dole, Operation Sharen Daji’ and numerous others counter-insurgency campaigns have been raised, to decimate the scourge. Without doubt, much casualty have been recorded by both Government and rebels at various theatres of operation: Maiduguri, Damaturu, Bauchi, Jos, Yola, Mubi, Suleja, Abuja, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria, Kotonkarfe, etc. Table 1 presents a bird’s-eye-view of some reported casualties from 2009 to 2012, for illustrative purposes. Undoubtedly, the figures must have increased considerably over the years, given the resilience of the rebels and intensity of the attacks.

**Table 1:** Some Casualty Reports Associated with Boko Haram Encounters, 2009-2012

| Date       | Estimated causality figure (feared dead) | Location                | Target   |
|------------|--|-------------------------|--|
| 26/7/2009  | 1  | Buachi                  | Attack on Police Station                         |
| 7/9/2010   | 1  | Ditto                   | Attack on Prisons                                |
| 11/10/2010 | 3 (injured)                              | Maiduguri               | Bomb Attack on Police State                      |
| 24/12/2010 | 8  | Jos                     | Bomb Attack                                      |
| 28/12/2010 | 38                                       | Ditto                   | Bomb Attack on Christmas Eve                     |
| 31/12/2010 | 11                                       | Abuja                   | Bomb Attack on Mogadishu Barracks, Mammy Market  |
| 1/4/2011   | Many (Unconfirmed figure)                | Bauchi                  | Attack on Police Station                         |
| 9/4/2011   | Ditto                                    | Maiduguri               | Attack on Polling Station                        |
| 25/12/2011 | 46 (or more)                             | Madala, new Suleja      | Bomb Attack on St. Theresa Catholic Church       |
| 6/1/2012   | 13                                       | Mubi                    | Gun- men Attack                                  |
| 21/1/2012  | (Unconfirmed) 185 (or more)              | Kano                    | Multiple Bomb Attack                             |
| 15/1/2012  | 1 (Warder)                               | Kotonkarfe              | Attack on Prisons, to Free Detained Sect Members |
| 29/4/2012  | 13                                       | Bayero University, Kano | Attack on Christian Worshippers                  |
| 12/6/2012  | 40                                       | Kaduna/Zaria            | Bomb Attack                                      |
| 8/10/2012  | 35                                       | Maiduguri               | Bomb Attack                                      |

Sources: ‘Punch’, 17 June, 2011; ‘Punch’ 23 February, 2012; ‘Punch’, 27 February, 2012, ‘The Guardian’, March, 2012, in Benjamin ()

The unexhausted locations of attacks also include Gwoza, Banki, Potiskum, Birnin Gwari, Chafe, Baga, Konduga, Gaidam, Kanama, Damboa, Ngazai, Ngamdu, Benisheik, etc.

Given the nature and modus operandi of Boko Haram operations and attacks therefore, it is confounding that the true philosophical and ideological underpinning of the myth had continually refracted away from the focal lenses of researches, leading to over-burdened and less efficacious counter-

insurgency operations, relief supplies for victims supply the and emergency management structures for displaced victims.

### 5.3 Theoretical Underpinning

Several theories have been advanced by scholars to explain the security issues raised in Nigeria by the emergence of Boko Haram. Most of the theories focus on the motives of the insurrections and their

propagators. The theories have been broadly categorized into internal and external versions, to address the internal and external motives or factors. Proponents of the internal factors hold that terrorism in Nigeria is attributable to poor socio-economic conditions, injustice, religious difference and, or intolerance, unfavourable political climate and entrenched corruption, among others. In this wise, Anyadike (2013) writes that the quest for a reprisal of the unwarranted killing of the sect's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, may have triggered the uprising.

On the other hand, the external forces relate to the extension of the trendy wave of the global "Islamic Jihad" propagated by transnational and international terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. The external factor hypothesis also believes that Boko Haram insurgency may be a conspiratorial strategy to achieve the prophesied national disintegration of Nigeria in near terms. Anyadike (2013), believes that jealous neighbours and fifth columnists may have targeted Nigeria, for liquidation. For example, to Anyadike (2013) the proliferation of arms in Nigeria, propelled by cross border movements of war-thirsty Libyan military adventurists, may have added impetus to the Haramist campaigns. The different views have provided the basis for a plethora of other theories: rational-vengeance, human needs/socio-economic, political feud, Islamic theocratic state, state failure, frustration-aggression and conspiracy. In line within the fundamental imperatives of internal security in national security architecture, this study aligns with the internal factors thesis premised on frustration-aggression, in examining the motives of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Given that socio-economic induced frustration exacts considerable negative effects on peace, it is expected that the preponderance of conflicts in poor and less developed countries as Nigeria should be very high. This is the utility of frustration-aggression theory in explaining the internal factors in the frequent social disturbances in poor climes. Originally expounded by Dollard (1939), Frustration-Aggression theory was remodeled by Yates (1962) and Berkowitz (1962). The cardinal thesis of the theory is that people resort to violence when they are frustrated by their inability to fulfill their needs. Because of the link between frustration and provocation, leading to aggression, the theory has been widely and suitably employed in explaining violent behaviour of people against the state as a reprisal for government's failure to perform under the social contract arrangement. What people get against what they expect amounts to their needs gaps and frustration. The wider the discrepancy

between what people get, what they ask for, and what, in their view is obtainable, the higher the probability of anger, leading to violence. Anifowose (1982), Faleti (2005), and Gurr (1970) provide varying insights into the psychological reactions of frustrated people to state apathy, given that government believes that resolving public demands tantamounts to weakness. Muazu (2011) provides a nutshell position to the effect that terrorism in Nigeria may have been motivated by bad governance, a soaring population of unemployed young people, endemic corruption by the elite class, poor healthcare, inadequate and dilapidating infrastructure, domestic and international criminality and political instability, among other factors.

## 6. Discussion

The set of beliefs which tend to shape the attitude of Boko Haram sect can be better located in the meaning of the name "Boko-Haram", that is, "Western education, book or indeed all things western are sinful, and therefore forbidden". It is a cardinal principle or rule of interpretation, to construe words in their ordinary and grammatical sense; except where ambiguity necessitates resort to the Golden rule. In this regard, the philosophy of Boko Haram sect is taken to be purely premised on the belief that all Western-originated and Western-oriented human creations devices or activities are sinful or forbidden, and must therefore be incinerated.

Flowing from the meaning and doctrine of the sect, it is discernable that their mission is "to extinguish "Western" but not "oriental" human creations. Nothing in the word suggests that the grouse against anything Western is because it is unIslamic or anti-Islam. It is surmised therefore that the importation of the qualification that Western education is "unIslamic" is the design of analysts or commentators. Suffice it to say instead that the sect only abhors Western education, irrespective of its sectarian application and implication.

This position is premised on the mode of operation of the sect: attacks directed at all and sundry, irrespective of religion, tribe and socio-economic and political ideology. Thus, at different locations in Nigeria, particularly in the North, mosques, churches, markets, social gatherings and even unsuspecting dwellings of diverse religions, economies and social classes have been randomly attacked and annihilated, leading to total socio-economic stagnation and untold hardship. The absence of sectarian insinuations in the sect's agenda is also illustrated by the abduction and

continued retention of the school girls from a Chibok high school, for many years, in defiance of all appeals from the local and international communities. If the attacks were selective, or if the Muslim abductees had been released, it would have been indicative of religious discrimination. In the interim, the reason that can be imputed is that the offence of the victims and by extension the Nigerian State, is the propagation of Western-type education, which contrary to the sect, is imprudent or against the tenets of Boko Haram ideology.

An argument often advanced by critics of the contradiction in the philosophy of the Haram sect is their employment and deployment of the weapon created through the scientific instrumentality of Western education. A plausible defence by the sect may be that in as much as the rifle is an instrument of human protection, the same rifle can be appropriately deployed to execute a capital offender (armed robber, murderer, kidnaper, etc), where the “law” so prescribes. To the Haramists therefore, eliminating Western education by using weapons created by the “forbidden education” may be justifiable. In the context of Nigeria’s experience, the motive of previous uprisings were relatively more definite and readable with respect to their goals and missions. Thus, the 19th century Jihads of Uthman Dan Fodio, the Maitatsine and the various insurgencies around the Niger Delta region all made clearly understandable and negotiable demands. While the Fodio Jihads sought to expand the territorial and spiritual horizons of Islam across Nigeria, the Niger Delta agitations were directed against economic and social marginalisation, with consequential demand for a more-equitable treatment, given the collateral damage to their environment and economies.

Against the backdrop of the rationale of Boko Haram’s “demand”, it remains inextricably difficult to discern the possibility of achieving such a futile goals as eradicating Western education and the imperatives. Realizing the futility, the sect seems to have adjusted its warfare to the guerilla-type, with clandestine attacks, as opposed to the initial infantry face-to-face combat.

As to why totally decimating the sect and its fatal activities in Nigeria has remained herculean, several hypotheses have been formulated, the sum total of which blames the failure on weak internal security (IS) particularly around the international borders. The lapses facilitate free flow of illegal aliens and arms; illicit finance flows which fund terrorist activities; drug trafficking; and external collaborations, among others.

The copious symptoms of weak internal security also alleged inadequacy include of the necessary support for military operations, child trafficking, religious conflicts, poverty, unemployment, economic sabotage, herders-farmers clashes, humongous level of internally displaced persons, among others. On the Nigerian Television Authority news at 9pm on 23 August, 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari announced the Federal Government’s new measures aimed at strengthening the IS of Nigeria. The measures included: recreation of Ministry of Police Affairs, to ensure proper equipment of the Force; complementary deployment of the Armed Forces, to support the Police; deployment of drones to forest areas, to track criminals in their hide-outs; and installation of close-circuit television devices on highways, to monitor vehicular movements for early detection of criminals, among others.

### **7. Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria**

Although Boko Haram insurgency may have been substantially degraded in relation to the erstwhile status, the continued onslaught on innocent Nigerians, particularly through the adoption of the not-easy-to-predict guerilla tactics, remains dangerous and injurious to the peace and security in the region where it is prevalent and to Nigeria at large. In addition to massive loss of lives and property occasioned by the attacks, no meaningful economic or social development can be contemplated in the circumstance.

The scourge has contributed significantly to the volatility of security around the borders and has exacerbated the situation. Consequently, trans-border flow of illegal “Jihadists” and arms has increased considerably. The risk is the high probability that the attacks may rebound, persist and escalate beyond imagination, unless drastic measures are taken by Government, to improve the internal security arrangement. Either case, the financial complications are enormous.

The international rating of Nigeria as an unsafe destination may isolate the country and diminish her prospects of growth and development. Envious neighbours can even capitalize on the debilitating effects of persistent attacks to contemplate and execute territorial and imperial incursions. Such inroads can be achieved via military support for or alliance with the insurgents. To be sure, Nigeria’s ability to perform in the social contract with the people, a reason advanced by analysts for the

insurgency, can diminish, to further justify the attacks.

The localization of the main theatre of the insurgent activities can experience a change and extension to other parts of Nigeria. In the circumstance, claims and counter accusations of ethnic or religious attacks by the new victims, albeit people of different regions, religions and tribes can trigger internal strifes and in extreme cases, a civil war, if protracted.

## 8. Findings and Conclusion

Arising from the foregoing analysis, the following findings are discernable:

- Boko Haram, unlike previous insurgencies in Nigeria, is “anti-West”, in contradistinction to the religious or economic “redress” by the predecessor-uprisings. In its essence and mission, the sect’s complaint is against Western education, which it claims is forbidden. No reference to or citation in any scripture or doctrine is provided, to guide an understanding of the imprudent position.
- In the light of 1 above, there is inherent contradiction in the goal and mission of the insurgency. Such contradiction or fallacy renders the sect’s demand non-negotiable and impossible.
- The focal target and modus operandi of the attacks leave no scintilla of a basis for imagining that the agenda contains a religious or economic motive: all and sundry, irrespective of religion, tribe, social status, age, occupation, etc are culpable, provided that they embrace Western education and adopt Western culture which they purport to be the architect of their grievances.
- Weak internal security and external conspiracy may be militating against the easily-rebounding and hence resilient operations of the Haramists. To be sure, the root of the international insecurity is planted under the failure of the State to perform in the social contract.

## 9. Conclusion

Boko Haram is a phenomenon which beats the imagination of Nigeria’s rulers and the people. With such blurred vision, mission and objective, it may be more convenient that the insurgency is an “enterprise” packaged to debilitate, if not annihilate

Nigeria, in the bid to propagate wonders by some 20th century Almoravids.

The philosophy and mode of operation of the insurgent sect predisposes the thinking that frustration is a critical undertone in the aggression. At a dialogue between sister bandits and Katsina State Government in September 2019, numerous insurgent groups through their spokesman, Alhaji Mansuni, offered to release about low victims held in captivity by the bandits, while blaming the whole situation on the unfortunate system failure. Occasioned by the negligent attitude of the Government

To Mansuni (2019):

*We Fulani have challenges which government should look into, including construction of roads, education, infrastructure and social living conditions. We are happy by your coming to visit us right in our hideouts. The indiscriminate arrest by security agencies and extortion by members of SARS, as well as the attitude of the Hausa in the rural communities who refused to co-exist with the Fulani, require we all sit down and iron out our differences.*

*The above remark was excerpted from the speech by Mansuni during the critical stakeholders’ parley at Tsamiya Primary School, Birnin Gogo in Faskari Local Government Area of Kastina State, at which the State Governor, Alhaji Aminu Masari, pledged to reciprocate the bandits’ gesture by freeing arrested Fulani bandits. ‘The Nation’ (2019).*

An important strategic dimension thus introduced into the situation is the collaboration between “military offensive” and “diplomatic imperatives in the overall plan designed to find a lasting solution to the hostilities. By agreeing to swap “War” captives, Government and the insurgents not only resolved to find a common solution but also agreed to respect each party’s rights. Impliedly, Government will forthwith address the elements of the social contracts which had remained the source of frustration and the resultant aggression.

## 10. Recommendations

In the light of the findings and conclusion, the following recommendations are proffered:

- Without prejudice to the provisions under the various agreements and protocols relating to regional or global economic integration, the Federal Government of Nigeria should overhaul the internal security arrangement, to further tighten trans-border free movement of people, arms and illicit finance.

- Community policing aimed at identifying aliens and strange people (with potentials for criminality) taking cover in the rural communities should be institutionalized, with a structure in place within the organogram of the Nigerian Police Force.
- Assuming that failure of the social contract and its implications for the welfare of the citizenry is a critical factor in the insurgency, Government should redouble her efforts at ameliorating the hardship of the people by providing basic amenities necessary for subsistence at the least of course this cardinal responsibility need not wait for an insurgent reaction before it is discharged, if Government were adequately responsive.
- On the external factors, Government should explore “diplomatic options” in the search for alternative and complementary solution. In this regard, reasonably perceived or known insurgent leaders or their collaborators should be approached via diplomatic maneuvers, to assuage them to withdraw continued sponsorship of or support for the insurgents. With such withdrawal of supply, the sect will crash out naturally. In September 2019, Donald Trump, United States President, accepted to hold a secret meeting with the Taliban around Camp David, in search of solution to the protracted insurgency leading to insecurity around the world. The Governor of Kasina State, Nigeria, also held a similar parley with insurgents terrorizing the State, and it was mutually agreed to amicably resolve all issues via reciprocity.
- Above all, Government should take urgent steps to enlist almost all out-of-school children in the region with predominant insurgent activities with a view to changing their negative indoctrination against the virtues of Western education. That way, they will appreciate the opportunities and irresistible offers in the new dawn. Besides being agents of change, they will be unavailable for enlistment into militia groups

## References

- Abimbola, J.O.& Adesote, S.A. (2012). “Domestic terrorism and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, issues and trends: A historical discourse”, *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*, Vol.2, September.
- Alozieuwa, S.H. (2012). “Contending theories on Nigeria’s challenges in the era of Boko Haram insurgency”, *The Peace and Conflict Review*, Vol. 17, Issue No.1, <http://www.reviewpeace.org>, 20 May, 2013.
- Anifowose, R. (1982). *Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Yoruba and Tiv experience*, New York, NOK Publishers.
- Anyadike, N.O. (2013). “Boko Haram and National Security Challenges in Nigeria, causes and solutions”, *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, Vol.4(5).
- Bashir, M. (2012) “100 million Nigerians in absolute poverty, Bureau says”, ‘Daily Trust’. Thursday, February 14, P1.
- Bumah, J. & Abimbola, A. (2009). “The Boko Haram & tragedy and other issues”, ‘The Punch’, Lagos, August 6.
- Danjibo, M.P. (2011), “Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence: The “Maitatsine” and “Boko Haram” crisis in Nigeria, Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.
- Dollard, J. (1939). *Frustration and aggression*, New Heaven, Yale University Press.
- Faleti, S.A. (2003). “Theories of social conflict” in Best, G (Ed.), *Introduction to Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Fwatshak, S.U. (2012). “Radical Islam in the Chad Basin, 1805-2015-2019: From the Jihad to Boko Haram,” in Uchendm, E (2012), *New face of Islam in Eastern Nigeria and the Chad Basin, Essays in Honour of Simon Ottenberge*.
- Gurr, T.R. (1970). *Why men rebel*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Walker, A . (2012). “What is Boko Haram?” Special Report of United States Institute of Peace, <http://www.usip.org>, 10 April, 2013
- Mauzu, A. (2011). “Understanding the emerging trend of terrorism in Nigeria: A case study of Boko Haram and similar groups”, Monograph Series 16, Nigeria, CLEEN Foundation.
- Mansuni, A. (2019). “Bandits offer to swap victims with arrested members”, Lagos, ‘The Nation’, Friday, September 6, p.7.
- Njoku, E.T. (2011). “Globalization and terrorism in Nigeria”, *Foreign Policy Journal*. <http://www.theglobalrealm>, 29 May, 2013.
- Nwankwo, A. (1998). *The logic of tyranny and lesson from history*, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishing Company.
- Oyeniya, A.B. (2010), “Terrorism in Nigeria: Group activities and politics”, *Journal of Politics*

- and Good Governance, Vol.1, No.1, 0976-1195.
- 'Punch' (2013). Boko Haram: "Taking policies too far", Editorial, June 12.
- 'Punch' (2011). <http://www.punchng.com/news/>,27 May, 2013
- 'The Guardian' (2012). 20 February 2012; 12 March, 2013, in Abimbola and Adesote (2011)
- Tough, B. (2013). "Democracy of Terrorism in Nigeria in the era of Boko Haram insurgency", Discourses in Governance, Democracy and Development in Contemporary Nigeria, Nwaneogbo, C.J. Oklobia, O. & Tsuwa, J.T. (Eds), Makurdi, SAP Publishing House.
- Uzodike, U.O & Whetho, A. (2011). "Exhausted nationalism, governance and ascendant pentecostalism in Nigeria", *Loyola Journal of Social Science*, 25 (2): 217-237
- Williams, A. (2009). "International terrorism and Nigeria's internal security: Issues and problems", *International Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No.2, April-July.
- Williams, P. (2006). International problems and international terrorism, Chicago, Chicago Press.