



Intelligence Management and its impact on Security Architecture in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State, Nigeria.

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Abstracts. This study examines Intelligence Management and Its Impact on the Security Architecture in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State, Nigeria. Primary data were derived from questionnaires and in-depth interviews with the Department of State Security Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Intelligence Agency, Force Intelligence Bureau, the Joint Intelligence Board, Office of the National Security Adviser, other security agencies like the Customs, Immigration, NSCDC, Prisons, NDLEA and other stakeholders. The system theory was adopted which holds that security architecture is made up of sub-systems, and when these sub-systems function properly, the system as a whole function well, but if one part is affected, it can impact on others. However, it was revealed that the similarities in the statutory roles of the various security agencies had made it difficult to demarcate their constitutional responsibilities, which often culminates in clashes between different personnel on various security issues rather than a joined-up approach to fighting crime in a joint security operations and the politicization of intelligence management had impacted negatively on the security architecture which has made recruitment easy for other forms of criminalities as they capitalize on the political situations of the country. Despite the provisions within the Intelligence Services Act 2001, the government is yet to appoint an ombudsman and standards unit for the intelligence agencies which will ensure it remains in compliance with Nigeria's democratic tenets. Therefore, the paper recommends that the Nigeria government should develop a mechanism capable of harmonizing the various agencies and enlighten them on the need to place national security above every other issues. In addition, the decision making's reaction to available intelligence is often slow and sometimes

uncoordinated; hence, intelligence operations need to be better coordinated, more robust and where possible, decentralized to identify potential threats within localities.

Keywords: Intelligence Management, Security, and Security Architecture

1. Introduction

The security architecture of a nation is the totality of its constitutional and legal framework, the institutions that form and provide safety and security services for its citizens in the defense of its territorial integrity. The national security architecture includes management, decision-making, and oversight structures of institutions as well as policies, strategies and plans (Bakrania & Haider 2016). In most countries, institutions and agencies like executive arms of governments, national security advisory bodies, legislative or parliamentary committees, ministry of defense, internal and external affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies, and civil society organizations make up and contribute to national security management (OECD 2007). Beane, Oliker, O'Brien, & Rathmell (2005) asserts that the coordination of decision making is important, and the effectiveness of security architecture depends on politically led security governance system, delivered by a constitutional mandated defense, security and intelligent institutions that are organized, trained, equipped and professionally led, with the various services and institutions that are constitutionally established are designed and mandated to address specific threats within defined domain. The reality and inevitability of overlaps responsibility across domains requires cooperation and collaboration to

denied space for any threat with the possibility to upsetting the whole architecture.

Global and local insecurities routinely inform and interact with each other. Hence, the acceptance that security measures designed to prevent and manage international threats, demands local intelligence sharing networks from remote to metropolitan settings. Impact from the proliferation of private security companies in Nigeria is not yet seen nor felt on the reduction of crime and criminalities due to the restricted operational landscape within which private security firms operate, and which could be seen in their inability to compete favorably in job security provision nor public safety delivery, as compared to their counterparts in other developed countries, whose operational spreads could be felt across the globe. (Mungadi & Onibiyo, 2020). But Bouwhuis (2018) submitted that tasks which are traditionally performed by public law enforcement agencies are being outsourced to private security companies due to rise in new threats level from non-state actors ranging from international terrorism, religious extremism, radicalism. The liberalists view of the provision of security is that, the pursuance of security can be achieved with the involvement of other actors offering the same services (Mutonyi et al. 2020). The deterioration and disintegration of the security architecture and arrangements in Nigeria has attracted serious concern as it has shown the failure of the Nigerian state to link the security of administrations to the physical security of the citizens as well as the failure to guarantee the security of the administration it represents. Consequently, both state and non-state actors, security analysts and the academia are compelled by necessity to rethink the concept and strategies for strategic paradigm shift. This is because there seem to be an ineradicable tendency to think that the nation seems not to realize that the best guarantee to security is the security of their citizens and the acceptance by the citizens of the political rule of the game upon which the legitimacy of the Nigeria rests.

The security architecture in Nigeria has been grossly accused of being concentric and archaic (Mai-Bashira, 2022). The Nigeria National Security architecture is too unitary to respond to complex federal structure like Nigeria (Yunusa et al. 2022). The Nigeria security architecture deemphasizes human security for State Security, and collaboration is mostly seen as reactive measures at the outbreak of ethno religious or communal clash, display of show of force as electoral process deterrence, counter-insurgency operation, and collaboration remain a mirage (Mungadi et al. 2020). Abysmal failure of the

national security architecture in achieving inter agency cooperation is seen in the incessant attack of correctional facilities by terrorists (Afuzie, 2022). This stresses the idea that security policies should capture all conditions that affect dignity, welfare, freedom of individuals and not only protect against war. It focuses on social and economic issues as they affect individual, promoting the view that security is dependent upon human development and stability (Crawford, 2013). Nnadozie, Usman & Okolie (2019) asserts that there is need for synergy between the Nigeria defense, security and intelligence organizations when they hold that collaborations and effective communication are much in deficiency and even in some cases absent among security agencies in Nigeria. It takes a robust and elaborate multi-agency, multi-disciplinary and professional network of agencies to effectively combat the modern security challenges emerging around the world, especially where they are enhanced by diverse uses of its conveniences which technological advancements and transport provide.

The need for inter-agency collaboration and coordination was rooted in global security experience and as a matter of global security best practices (Han 2013). Carton (2016) holds that some levels of coordination exist within Nigeria internal security services, but sometime information is hoarded and other agencies are treated with suspicion, leading to information silos and analysis gap. The unfortunate Boko Haram insurgents' abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls, show the command and control coordination and collaboration among state institutions causes grave breaches to national security and safety of citizens. Han (2013) holds that in dealing with threats that are highly networked, and run by operatives that communicate with each other in a complex way, state security information management must be coordinated at inter-agency levels from the strategic to the operational cadres. Intelligence and operational units at state services must synergizes efforts to achieved sustainable successes. Inter-agency coordination and collaboration in security services are mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered by organizations to achieved common goal. Intelligence management procedure for exchange of information between participating agencies must be worked out for cooperation to work, and this procedure must be broad-based covering local, national and regional levels administrative units of participating agencies. The relevant cadre of each executive officers in each agency need to have quick and easy access to availability and needed information within other participating agencies. However, the rate of

insecurity and the poor level of coordination and collaborations between inter-agency towards intelligence management in Nigeria have led to this study not only in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State, but Nigeria in general.

2. Conceptual Framework

2.1 Concept of Intelligence

A review of literature indicates that intelligence has been conceptualized and presented by scholars and practitioners in diverse contexts. Gustavo (2005) observed that there is no universally acceptable definition of the concept of intelligence as most scholars look at the definition from different scope and perception. Randol (2009) observed that one of the most meaningful purposes of intelligence is to predict where future security challenges may arise. Security intelligence may be defined as the threat of major, politically motivated violence, or equal grievous harm to national security or the economy, inflicted within the nation's territorial limits by international terrorists, homegrown terrorists, or spies of saboteurs employed or financed by foreign nations (Posner, 2002). Duyan (2012) conceptualized intelligence as Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. Oghi & Unumen, (2014) sees intelligence as the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns areas of operations and potentially significant to planning. Intelligence, with regards to the military, could be strategic, tactical and counter intelligence. Intelligence in this context is a response to a specific question or issue, structured to provide a basis for action and presented to an individual or group empowered to act. Lowenthal (2002) notes that, Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.

Shulsky & Schmitt (2002), the term intelligence is applied to different kinds of information activities and organization. Intelligence is the information relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with actual and potential adversaries. This definition seems to have been drawn from State-centric perspective of national security with emphasis on information relevant only

to government even though the advantages and the application are relevant universally and not restricted to government enterprises alone. The goal of intelligence is one of eliminating or reducing uncertainty for government decision-makers. Johnson (2010) states that the purpose of intelligence is to provide information to policy makers that may help illuminate their decision options. West (2004) argues that the reality of intelligence operations cannot be portrayed entirely accurately in works of fiction (Gustavo, 2005). Bruneau & Dombroski (2014) asserts that reform in the intelligence sector has been difficult because of its pervasive public distrust of institutions, the problem of politicization of the bureaucracy, and the consequent lack of a corporate culture or tradition of public service. Hammond (2015) suggest that intelligence exists because governments seek to hide information from other governments, which in turn, seek to discover hidden information by means that they wish to keep secret. Ratcliffe (2003) views intelligence "as a structure, a process and a product." He explains that intelligence units are typically units with specialized skills and people within police departments. According to Ratcliffe, (2003) "Intelligence is also a process, incorporating a continuous cycle of tasking, data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback, prior to the next, or a refined task, this continuous process is responsible for the generation of an intelligence product was designed to shape the thinking of decision-makers" (Ratcliffe, 2003).

Pillar (2017) observed that the biggest challenge is the inherent difficulty of discovering plots that involve small numbers of people who do their planning and preparation in secret and are highly conscious of operational security. Metscher & Gilbride (2005) argued that Intelligence is a product created through the process of collecting, collating, and analyzing data, for dissemination as usable information that typically assesses events, locations or adversaries, to allow the appropriate deployment of resources to reach the desired outcome. Bruneau & Dombroski, (2014) stated that in most instances the intelligence service rhetorically linked internal opposition to putative foreign enemies, the overwhelming focus of the intelligence service in most countries was on domestic opposition. Johnson (2010) states that 'national security intelligence is the knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us- the prelude to presidential decisions and actions.' Johnson (2010) further observes that the national security intelligence, other than information product also refer to a set of missions carried out by a nation's secret agencies and organizations that carry out the missions of collection and-analysis,

counterintelligence, and covert action. Johnson (2010) elucidates that the national security intelligence may be different from strategic intelligence, although the concepts are used interchangeably as it encompasses tactical as well as strategic intelligence. Kuosa (2014) reports that “the term ‘foresight’ refers to a systematic process where one attempts to say something comprehensive and grounded about the futures probabilities, change drivers, change factors, interrelations, and options for actions. National security intelligence depends on resources; data needs; creative thinking; bonding between practitioners and management; and reliability of judgments and forecasts’ impactful to the organization.

2.2 Concept of Security

Security is a normative and emotionally idea with no independent meaning but related to a context and a specific individual or societal value system and its realization (Brauch, 2008; Mesjasz, 2004). Security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values. The traditional notion of security places emphasis on the protection of state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against domestic and external threats. However, in the last decade of the Twentieth Century the Bretton Woods institutions upheld that the State-centric notion of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on human security. That is, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (Watson, 2011). Security according to this people-centered conception means safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the pattern of daily lives - whether in homes, jobs, communities or environment (Kumssa & Jones, 2010). Brauch (2004) critically examined the concept, concludes that the political and scientific concept of security has changed with the international order. It stands to reason that the conventional concept of security wherein the state is both the object of security and the primary provider of security falls short of a comprehensive and an adequate consideration of the phenomenal essence of security.

Pam (2005), adopting the Human Security Report, notes that the term ‘human security’ defines security in terms of an integrated idea of positive peace, human rights and sustainable development. It is related to the enhancement of livelihood of all people at risk, the values of the respect of human rights, the

dignity of the individual, respect for diversity, community empowerment, decentralized forms of government, peace and coexistence and the accountability and transparency of actions aimed at the betterment of livelihood (Human security Report, 2003; Ikonne, et al 2005). The promotion of human security is realized ultimately through freedom from want and fear. The realization of human securitization clearly requires multiple efforts, all of which should be integrated and linked to the ultimate goal of providing for the sanctity of life and liberty (Watson, 2011; Liotta, 2002). Human security has been associated with freedom from danger to life and property and the presence of conducive atmosphere for the people to pursue their legitimate interests within the society (Bassey, 2004). Human security requires rules and impartial adjudication and application which can hardly exist without due provision of adequate national security. Indeed, aggressive and repressive states can be major sources of human insecurity and a greater cause of human travail (Idowu, 2013). The security threats and challenges in Nigeria are enormous, the growing incidence of hostage-taking and kidnapping, militant insurgencies, pipeline vandalism, ethnic insurrections, fatal inter- and intra-community conflicts, inter- and intra-religious wars, illegal arms trafficking, armed banditry, political violence and gangsters, the quality and quantity of ordinance on charge to militant insurgents and hoodlums, the courage and zeal usually exhibited by bandits in their nefarious activities, the spate of unemployment, the state of poverty among the citizens, the infrastructural and institutional collapse and the obvious ineffective state response are veritable indicators of the scale of insecurity in Nigeria today. These indices also indicate that the national security architecture may have fallen short of the security objectives.

2.3 Concept of Security Architecture

The major explanation for the upsurge in the scale of violent insecurity and the poor delivery of Nigeria’s security architecture is the centralization of security apparatus. This partly relates to the historical evolution and philosophy of the security services. The Nigeria Police Force was created by the British colonialists to deal with the ‘troublesome natives’. Originating from the West African Frontier Force, the Police was centralized and oriented towards ensuring compliance with the imperial Acts of 1807 and 1833 which abolished slavery and slave trade as well as achieving the colonial objectives of ‘divide and rule’ and for facilitating the passage of raw materials to the metropole (Jemibewon, 2001).

However, over five decades since Nigeria got political independence, the country's security architecture remains structurally centralized with damning consequences for management of crime and insecurity at the grassroots. Despite persistent agitations for community and state policing so that local people familiar with the language, geography and socio-political terrains will be in charge of security, the federal government continues to hold on to the police and armed forces tenaciously. However, the intrusion of the military into politics disrupted the functioning of Nigerian federalism. The country experienced military coups in 1966 (January and July), 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985 and 1993) as well as a civil war (1967-1970). These long years of military rule resulted in the hyper-centralization of power (including the police and armed forces) and resources at the federal level. For example, the regional constitutions which existed between 1960 and 1967 were abolished; the regional police formations were centralized; the universities established by the regions were taken over; the local government system of administration was unified; and a Land Use Decree was promulgated in 1978 ceding the ownership of all lands to the government (Aghedo & Osumah, 2009). These were some of the features that characterized military rule and dismantled Nigerian federalism (Ekeh, 2007). This over-centralization was made possible by the oil boom of the early 1970s which made the first phase of Nigerian military government (1966-1979) to be awash with enormous oil rents. During this period, the application of the federal character principle was badly assaulted; revenue allocation became terribly centralized.

Empirical Review

2.4 Intelligence Management and the Security Architecture in Nigeria.

Intelligence is the most vital instrument of any state and good intelligence is the best defense of a state. McDowell (2008) state that, this form of intelligence may be localized at district or regional level, or it may be conducted at headquarters level close to the organizational and national clients, whether they are in corporate executives, senior government officials, group commanders, or politicians. In essence, in the law enforcement context, strategic intelligence provides senior managers and executives with insight and understanding into current and emerging trends; changes in the crime environment; threats to public safety and order; opportunities for controlling action and the development of counter programs and likely avenues for change to policies, strategies, programs, and legislation. Literally, intelligence failure implies that intelligence was not available to, or fell short of,

or could not serve its purpose of aiding policy makers to take the correct decisions as may be revealed by later information and occurrence. Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) define intelligence failure as "essentially a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interest." Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) further assert that, "whether it is subjectively surprised by what happens is less important than the fact that the government or the military is doing or continues to do the wrong thing. And that 'the possible failure of intelligence to assess a situation correctly is a danger coeval to intelligence itself."

Jervis (2001) advances that the most obvious sense of intelligence failure is a mismatch between the estimates and what later information reveals. This is simultaneously the most important and least interesting sense of the term. It is the most important because to the extent that policy depends on accurate assessments, almost the only thing that matters is accuracy. Brockington, (2012) sees intelligence failure as the inability of one or more parts of the intelligence process-collection, evaluation and analysis, production, dissemination to produce timely, accurate intelligence on an issue or event of importance to national interests. Brockington (2012) further observes that Shulsky's definition gives an impression of misunderstanding of intelligence by consumers as the core in intelligence failure; Lowenthal's definition presents faulty analysis process as central to intelligence failure which is reconciled by Brockington (2012) that "intelligence failure is the result of an adversary actions that were not identified during the intelligence cycle and achieves strategic surprise, despite the government having all the information necessary to anticipate the events and its consequences.

Intelligence failure is a hitch at any stage or by any actor in the intelligence process that results in inaction and or inappropriate action that is inimical, or detrimental to national interest or the interest of an actor. Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) note that, "this involves instances in which relevant information cannot be obtained at all and or disorder of the analytical process that causes data to be ignored or misinterpreted and instances in which there are supervening institutional limitations." The consequences are usually surprise attacks, operational and tactical failures, or ignorance of the real facts of a situation resulting in the continuation of a wrong policy. Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) further asserts that intelligence is a word describing a perceived reality, event, action, state of affairs, subject or object. It

could only seem plausible to estimate that intelligence like most concepts in social inquiries has its definitional and conceptual nuances in relation to contexts, subject, object, environment and usage/register. Jervis (2001) observes that, despite the fact that most theories of international politics assume that actors see the world fairly accurately, many wars are preceded if not caused by failures to predict what others will do, and almost by definition crises involve intelligence failures. He argues that intelligence and critics rely on intuitive ways of and rhetorical forms of exposition. More careful, disciplined, and explicit reasoning will not automatically yield the right answers but will produce better analysis, do better job of revealing where the key differences in opinion lie, and increase the chances of being correct.

More so, intelligence is considered the first line of defense against terrorists. Collecting it does no good if it is not analyzed and then shared with other institutions and agencies combating terrorism. Amaraegbu (2013) opined that intelligence gathering is key in fighting chronic and difficult battles that makes up insurgency. To evaluate accurately terror threats and the character of terrorist organizations is an extremely challenging task for states. In Nigeria, there are four statutory security intelligence agencies, the State Security Service (SSS), Defense Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB). Though each of the four intelligence agencies has its specific tasks defined by law, to undertake their tasks efficiently and effectively, they coordinate their activities among themselves with the aim of providing adequate security of lives and property. The only existing channels of coordination between them is the Joint Intelligence Board and the Office of the National Security Adviser (Arase, 2013). The four security intelligence agencies have different responsibilities relating to intelligence generation concerning internal security, defense and external subversion respectively. The state security services are in charge of protecting government officials and property and gathering vital domestic intelligence; the defense intelligence agency protect the territorial sovereignty of Nigeria and promote cooperation with military allies to foster regional and global security. The national intelligence agency is charged with external intelligence, while the Force Intelligence Bureau is to gather intelligence for the department of police on criminal activities and the lead agency for counter terrorism in Nigeria is the office of the National Security Adviser.

However, the role of the office has been politicized by forces of religion and ethnicity and this has made it very difficult to gather human intelligence. This weakness has made it possible for foot soldiers of Boko Haram to carry out their attacks on soft targets which include places of worship and businesses. Blanchard (2016) argued that the group has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in Nigeria. He further stated that the inability of the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram were a lack of coordination and cooperation between security agencies; corruption; misallocation of resources; limited requisite databases; the slow pace of the judicial system; and lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to implement anti-terrorism laws" (Blanchard, 2016). The Nigerian security forces in their present state do not appear to be in a position to defeat terrorists and kidnappers. Amaraegbu (2013) noted that their ubiquitous roadblocks, token arrests, reactive soldiers neither frighten Boko Haram nor other contestants (kidnappers and armed robbers) with superior fire power. This politicization of the intelligence community has made recruitments easy for Boko Haram leaders as they capitalize on the political situations (corruption and political instability) of the country. Osumah (2013) state that this is because security issues have allegedly been manipulated by the Nigerian ruling-elite at various levels of government to allow them set aside huge sums of money as security votes (Money received to counter-terrorism), which is often subject to abuses. Informants have directly linked corruption to the lack of weapons to fight terrorism (Pate, 2015).

Amaraegbu, (2013) holds that Nigeria's effort to defeat Boko Haram has not yielded the expected results, despite allocating approximately 25% of its budget to security in what ought to translate to improved military and intelligence coordination sector. Pate (2015) further opined that several informants allege that money allocated for arming and training forces fighting Boko Haram has instead been misappropriated by military and political leaders for their personal gain. Amaraegbu (2013) notes that at some point, President Jonathan inadvertently admitted that Nigeria's security and intelligence community, under his watch lack required intelligence capacity to carry out their basic duty of identifying enemy of State. Amaraegbu (2013) concluded that Boko Haram operates undetected because the local residents do not trust the government well enough to offer intelligence information. Majority of locals are hesitant, or unwilling, to provide information to security operatives about the hideouts and activities of the

sect members. The absolute mistrust, suspicion, and fear characterize the relationship between the security operatives and the civilian populations in the volatile states, undermining intelligence undertakings that would lead to definite identification and extirpation of the sect's members and their activities (Amaraeibu, 2013). There is need for human intelligence in other to know the activities and operations of the group, modern technologies like GPS and satellites have their limitations and these cannot be 100% accurate as human intelligence which is based on primary source (Amaraeibu, 2013).

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Systems Theory

The system theory is more easily understood if one understands the concept of sub-systems. The security architecture is made up of sub-systems, and when these sub-systems function properly, the system as a whole function well, but if one part is affected, it can impact on others, so the sub-systems are interconnected and their functions impact the others. Given the dynamic nature of events and crowds, bringing security goals and actions together in a way that is holistic and integrated requires a systems approach. A system is an integrated collection of parts (agencies). Each part, although it is bounded, is interrelated to other parts. Systems theory seeks to understand this and to predict how developments and changes will affect the system as a whole. Generally, systems theory is about broadly applicable concepts and principles, as opposed to concepts and principles applicable to one domain of knowledge. It distinguishes dynamic or active systems from static or passive ones. Active systems are activity structures or components that interact in behaviors and processes while passive systems are structures and components that are being processed. Security

implementation is an active system because changes made to increase security presence and security controls and response will change the other actors and agents in the event environment which may be a positive change for e.g. increasing the number of personnel can make a crowd feel safer or happier. On the other hand, increasing the number of personnel may increase the crowd hostility. Adequate and prompt dissemination of information to personnel may reduce any intending security threats that might occur. Therefore, in developing security planning and methodology aimed at improving management of the security architecture of a country, a systems approach is the overarching theoretical framework on which the process relies.

4. Research Methodology

Karu is one of the Local Government Areas created in 1991 out of Keffi Local Government Area of Nasarawa State. Karu Local Government Area has five indigenous ethnic groups - Gbagyi, Koro, Gwandara, Yeskwa and Gade. Karu LGA shares boundaries with Nasarawa Local Government Area in the Southeast, Panda in the North and Abuja (the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria) in the West. The population of Karu has been projected to be 1,068,480 (NPC Projection, 2022), In this study, the sampled population was 10,980, with this population and the margin of error of 0.05 confidence level of 95% and with the recommended sample size of the study based on the total population of the selected agencies is 370 using the Research Advisors (2006). 370 questionnaires were administered to respondents in the sampled agencies and was filled and returned. Chi square was used for the analysis at 0.05 level of significance with the used of the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 20. In-depth interviews were conducted with stakeholders and an in-depth summary and coding were used for the analysis.

5. Analysis and Discussion of Findings

Table 1: Respondents Responses on the Causes of Intelligence Management Failure on the Security Architecture in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State.

Causes of Intelligence Failure	Frequencies	Percentages
Politicization	153	41.4
Denial and Deception	102	27.6
Insufficient Information	64	17.3
Conflicting Pressure	51	13.8
Total	370	100

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Square	19.870 ^a	6	.087
Likelihood Ratio	18.608	6	.074
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.917	1	.019
N of Valid Cases	370		

4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

Table 2: Respondents Responses on the Impact of Intelligence Management Failure on the Security Architecture in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State.

Impact of Intelligence Management Failure on the Security Architecture in Karu	Frequencies	Percentages
Suspicious Attacks	125	33.8
Tactical Failure	107	28.9
Wrong Policies	77	20.8
Misunderstanding/mismanagement of information	61	16.5
Total	370	100

Source: Field Survey, 2023. contingency

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Chi-Square	11.808 ^a	6	.066
Likelihood Ratio	12.308	6	.055
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.991	1	.014
N of Valid Cases	370		

4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .07.

Table 1 above shows that 153 of the respondents representing (41.4%) of the total respondents asserts that politicization is the cause of intelligence failure on the security architecture in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State. 102 of the respondents representing (27.6%) of the total respondents holds that Denial and Deception are the causes of intelligent failure on security architecture in Karu Local Government Area. 64 of the respondents constituting (17.3%) of the responses from respondents asserts that Insufficient Information is the cause of intelligence failure in Karu Local Government Area, while 51 of the respondents representing (13.8%) of the responses made from respondents' states that Conflicting Pressure is one of the causes of intelligence failure on security architecture in Karu Local Government Area. Also, in table 2, 125 of the respondents holds that suspicious attacks are the cause of intelligence management failure, this figure represents (33.8%) of the total responses given by respondents on security architecture in Karu Local Government Area. Also, Based on the statistical analysis, the result indicates that there is no relationship between intelligence management failure and its impacts on the security architecture in Karu Local Government Area. Although studies conducted by Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) affirmed that intelligence management failure

107 respondents constituting (28.9%) of the total respondents affirmed that tactical failure was as a result of intelligence management failure on the security architecture Karu Local Government Area. 77 (20.8%) of the respondents affirmed that wrong government policies were the cause of intelligence management failure on the security architecture Karu Local Government Area, while the 61 of the respondents representing (16.5%) asserts that Misunderstanding or the mismanagement of information was the cause of intelligence management failure on the security architecture in Karu Local Government Area. This result is in line with that of Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) who define intelligence failure as “essentially a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interest.” They also drew instances from empirical cases on the causes of intelligence failure to unavailability of information when and where needed.

is essentially a misunderstanding of a situation that leads Government to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interest. The consequences are usually surprise-attacks, operational and tactical failures, or ignorance of the real facts of a situation resulting in the

continuation of a wrong policy. Similarly, Brockington (2012) holds that intelligence failure is the result of an adversary actions that were not identified during intelligence cycle and achieves strategic surprise, despite government having all information necessary to anticipate the events and its consequences. However, result have shown that there is a relationship between the politicization of intelligence management and its impact on the security architecture in Karu Local Government Area. This result is in line with Pate (2015) opinion that several informants allege that money allocated for arming and training forces fighting insurgents have been misappropriated by military and political leaders for their personal gain. Similarly, Amaraegbu (2013) holds that ubiquitous roadblocks, token arrests, reactive soldiers neither frighten insurgents nor other contestants (kidnappers and armed robbers) with superior fire power. This politicization of intelligence agencies has made recruitment easy for criminal elements as they capitalize on the political situations (corruption and political instability) of the country. Also, Osumah (2013) state that this is because security issues have allegedly been manipulated by the Nigerian ruling-elite at various levels of government to allow them to set aside huge sums of money as security votes, which is often subject to abuses. However, security experts have call for precise, concise and operational concepts to facilitate objective application in security administration in Nigeria.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

The security architecture in Nigeria has been grossly accused of being concentric and archaic, and too unitary to respond to complex federal structure like Nigeria. This security architecture deemphasizes human security for State Security, and collaboration is mostly seen as reactive measures at the outbreak of ethno religious/communal clash, display of show of force as electoral process deterrence, counter-insurgency while collaboration remains a mirage. The abysmal failure of the security architecture in achieving inter agency cooperation is seen in the incessant attack of facilities by terror. Although, there are similarities in the statutory roles of the security agencies that had made it difficult to demarcate their constitutional responsibilities, which often culminates in clashes between different personnel on various security matters rather than a joined-up approach to fighting crime in a joint security environment. To achieve overall security, cooperative and team operations are necessary between or among these agencies. It is not an exaggeration to assert that the fight against insurgency and banditry in the country

is unsuccessful, because of the disharmonious disposition of the security agencies. Therefore, the Nigeria government should develop a mechanism capable of harmonizing the various agencies and enlighten them on the need to place national security above everything else. One other factor that has worsened insecurity in the country is the inadequacies within the production of credible intelligence, including the lack of synergy and poor usage of intelligence products, which has allowed the threat elements to persist and foster. Where there is sufficient information on the threats, the process of collection and analysis of same is stifled by service bureaucracy. In addition, the decision maker's reaction to available intelligence is often slow and sometimes uncoordinated. Intelligence operations need to be better coordinated, more robust and where possible, decentralized to identify threats within localities. Additionally, despite provisions within the Intelligence Services Act 2001, the government is yet to appoint an ombudsman and standards unit for the intelligence community which will ensure it remains in compliance with Nigeria's democratic tenets.

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